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TWO SIDES TO EVERY STORY: MEASURING THE
JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT IN FEDERAL COURTS
Evan A. Creutz"
INTRODUCTION
"How did I get here?" This basic question has echoed through
courthouses across the United States since the inception of our legal
system. Defendants frequently wonder how one court, rather than
another, came to be the arbiter of their rights. A court would violate
the constitutional prohibition against "depriv[ing] any person of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law"' if it entered judgment
against a defendant without adequately demonstrating that it had the
power to do so. The United States Constitution, in broad strokes,
outlines the circumstances in which the federal courts have the power
to resolve disputes between citizens. These strokes are the basis of
federal jurisdiction.
The doctrine of "personal jurisdiction," or the "power of a court
over the person of a defendant,"2 is one important limitation on the
authority of federal courts. The extent of federal courts' power over
individual defendants has varied considerably over the past century.
Mileposts marking the changes in personal jurisdiction are readily
identifiable, 3 and a clear understanding of the doctrine's development
* Deepest thanks to Charles, Margaret, Douglas, and Heather Creutz for their
unconditional love, unflagging support, and, though rarely necessary, tolerance.
Special thanks to Professor Marc Arkin for her insightful criticism.
1. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
2. Black's Law Dictionary 1144 (6th ed. 1990).
3. Historically, the Supreme Court has maintained tight control over the
expansion of personal jurisdiction toward its outer constitutional limits. In 1877, the
Court held that a state judgment was void because defendant was not served with
process while physically present in the state. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733-34
(1877). In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), the Court held
that while physical presence was sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction, it was not
necessary as long as defendant had "minimum contacts" with the forum state. See id.
at 320. Subsequent decisions revealed that "minimum contacts" could include actions
that are purposefully directed toward the forum state's residents, even if defendant
never enters the forum state. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476
(1985). The developments since Pennoyer have not invalidated physical presence as a
sufficient rationale for establishing jurisdiction, but have merely created an analogous
standard by which state procedures for establishing jurisdiction over absent
defendants can be evaluated for constitutional fairness. See Burnham v. Superior
1719
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has traditionally been fundamental to the education of beginning
lawyers. On the other hand, the doctrine of "subject matter
jurisdiction," or the power of a court to hear cases of a general class,,
has evolved more subtly, and perhaps, with less attention.
The form of federal subject matter jurisdiction here addressed is
diversity jurisdiction. "Diversity" refers to the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to hear cases between citizens of different states.' The
constitution does not require Congress to confer diversity jurisdiction
on the federal courts.6 Instead, Article III vests Congress with the
discretionary power to implement the Constitutional subject matterjurisdiction grant through legislation. 7  Pursuant to that authority,
Congress enacted the diversity jurisdiction statute (hereinafter
"section 1332").8 The traditional justification behind section 1332 has
been to provide out-of-state plaintiffs with a forum unfettered by the
local prejudice thought to be common in the state courts.9 This
justification is balanced, however, by the countervailing principle that,
because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, there is a
presumption against their availability. 0 Thus, Congress has imposed
limitations on the scope of section 1332's jurisdictional grant.
One way Congress limited the scope of section 1332 was by
including an "amount-in-controversy" requirement." Generally, this
requirement provides that the federal courts shall have jurisdiction
only over cases in which the value of the dispute exceeds a minimum
monetary amount.12 Often, however, disputes are of different value to
the adverse parties. Consider, for instance, a plaintiff who, claiming
minor property damage, sues a severely injured non-resident
defendant in state court for allegedly causing a car accident. Assume
that plaintiff, wishing to have the case decided in the state forum,
alleges damages below the statutory minimum. Defendant, believing
plaintiff was at fault and wishing compensation for her astronomic
Court. 495 U.S. 604,619 (1990).
4. See Black's Law Dictionary 1425 (6th ed. 1990).
5. See id. at 477.
6. See U.S. Const. art. III, §§ 1, 2.
7. See id.
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994).
9. See Charles Alan Wright, Law of Federal Courts § 23, at 128 (4th ed. 1983).
But see Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 Harv. L.
Rev. 483, 493 (1928) (arguing that "such information as we are able to gather...
entirely fails to show the existence of prejudice on the part of the state judges").
Even if state court prejudice did not exist, however, section 1332 exists to relieve
litigants' fear of prejudice. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 5.3, at 275
(2d ed. 1994).
10. See Chemerinsky, supra note 9, § 5.1, at 249.
11. The other major limitation on section 1332, not addressed in this Note, is the
"complete diversity" rule, which requires that each defendant be from a different
state than each plaintiff. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267,267 (1806).
12. Currently, the federal jurisdictional minimum is $75,000. See The Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 3850.
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medical expenses, may try to remove the controversy to federal court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441,13 perhaps to avoid the possibility of bias
m state court.14 The lawsuit is of different value to each party, and
depending on how the court measures the amount in controversy,
removal to the federal forum either will or will not be available to
defendant.
A belief commonly held in legal circles is that plaintiff possesses
unilateral control over the disposition of her claim., In Louisville &
Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 6 the Supreme Court propagated that
belief, holding that a court should look only to the questions raised in
a well-pleaded complaint when determining whether federal question
subject matter jurisdiction 7 exists.19 The legal community has
inexplicably imported this "well-pleaded complaint" rule into
diversity jurisdiction, and has assumed that, for the purposes of
determining the jurisdictional amount, plaintiff's complaint always
controls. This has occurred despite the fact that the Supreme Court
has expressly limited Mottley to cases arising under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.19
As a consequence, a defendant whose stake in a dispute would
otherwise merit adjudication in federal court is often unfairly trapped
13. The removal statute provides: "[A]ny civil action brought in a [sltate court of
which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be
removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States
for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." 28
U.S.C. § 1441.
14. The removal statute is thought to exist primarily because of the belief that
"both the plaintiff and defendant should have the opportunity to benefit from the
availability of a federal forum." Chemerinsky, supra note 9, § 5.5, at 323. Thus, also
allowing a defendant to avoid state court bias, the removal statute "effectuates a
primary purpose of diversity jurisdiction in providing a seemingly more neutral
forum." Id.
15. See Joseph W. Glannon, Civil Procedure: Examples and Explanations 83 (2d
ed. 1992) ("The traditional rule in American courts has been (and largely, still is)
that... 'the plaintiff is master of his claim."'); 14B Charles Alan Wright et al.,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 3702, at 46 (3d ed. 1998) ("Under well-settled
principles, the plaintiff is the master of his or her claim ... .
16. 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
17. Federal courts have "federal question" subject matter jurisdiction over cases
arising under the Constitution, acts of Congress, or treaties. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
18. In Mottley, plaintiff brought suit in federal court against defendant railroad
company to compel performance on a contract that conferred upon plaintiff a free
railroad pass for life. See Mottley, 211 U.S. at 150. Defendant claimed as a defense
that an act of Congress forbidding free railroad transportation invalidated the
contract. See id- at 151. For the purposes of satisfying jurisdictional requirements,
plaintiff assumed that defendant's plan to invoke an act of Congress as a defense
created a federal question for the federal court. See id. at 152. The circuit court
entered judgment for plaintiff. See id. at 151. The Supreme Court, reviewing the basis
for jurisdiction sua sponte, held that the mere anticipation of a defense invoking a
federal question was insufficient to confer federal question jurisdiction. See id. at 152.
Mottley implied that the federal question must appear on the face of plaintiffs
complaint for federal question jurisdiction to be sustainable. See id. at 153.
19. See American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247, 258 (1992) (The 'well-
pleaded complaint' rule applies only to statutory 'arising under' cases .... ").
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in state court by plaintiffs forum choice.
The unfounded application of the "well-pleaded complaint" rule to
the amount in controversy in diversity cases has created an
inconsistency in the treatment of adverse parties that strains the
interests of justice. Because of blind allegiance to the "plaintiff as
master of her claim" principle, the legal community has allowed
plaintiffs greater latitude in availing themselves of the protection
against prejudice, actual or merely perceived, that section 1332
provides. By assuming a more liberal standard for calculating the
jurisdictional amount, one that takes into account the value of the
dispute to all parties involved, courts could ensure equal availability of
the federal forum to all deserving litigants.
This Note reviews the development of the jurisdictional amount
requirement in diversity cases, and addresses whether the traditional
limitation of the amount in controversy to plaintiff's ad damnum best
serves the interests of fairness and efficiency. Part I of this Note
provides a brief factual background of the amount-in-controversy
requirement. This part then explains various approaches to
determining the jurisdictional amount, and their theoretical
underpinnings. Part II defines both permissive and compulsory
counterclaims, and details their relevance to calculating the
jurisdictional amount. Part III argues that the "well-pleaded
complaint" rule, as courts have applied it to diversity cases in the form
of the "plaintiff-viewpoint" approach, is overly rigid and should not
extend beyond its original application to statutory "arising under"
cases. This part advocates adopting a limited version of the "either-
party" approach to determining the jurisdictional amount. Finally,
this Note concludes that because no binding authority has directly
addressed how a court should determine the jurisdictional amount,
the legal profession should rethink its devotion to the "plaintiff-
viewpoint" approach and adopt a rule that is more consistent with the
policies behind diversity jurisdiction and the amount-in-controversy
requirement.
I. DETERMINATION OF THE AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY
This part briefly details the theoretical rationale behind the
amount-in-controversy doctrine and explains the basic mechanics of
its application to diversity actions. It then describes various
approaches to determining the jurisdictional amount and illustrates
how courts have employed these approaches.
A. The Amount in Controversy Summarized
The Constitution does not require that a minimum amount be in
controversy between litigating parties in order for them to invoke the
1722 [Vol. 68
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subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. Just as the
Constitution grants Congress the authority to "ordain and establish"
inferior federal courts,21 Congress also wields the power to limit the
jurisdiction of those courts." In exercising that power, Congress has
passed statutes imposing minimum monetary requirements for
invoking the diversity jurisdiction "- of federal courts.24
The original Congressional intent behind the amount-in-
controversy requirement is not entirely clear from legislative history.P
Some scholars argue that the original purpose of the requirement was
to protect defendants from having to travel long distances to defend
relatively small claims." Today, that reasoning is less applicable in
light of the increasing feasibility of interstate travel. A more modem
justification for the jurisdictional amount, as evidenced by the number
of successive increases in the amount by Congress,-7 is to reduce the
caseload in an already congested federal court system.-
Litigating parties cannot consent to subject matter jurisdiction, as
they can to personal jurisdiction.29 Thus, waiving the jurisdictional
20. See U.S. Const. art. III, §§ 1, 2.
21. Id. § 1.
22- See Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226,234 (1922).
23. The amount-in-controversy requirement applies to all cases arising under
diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994) ("The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the
sum or value of $75,000 .... "). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 24, there are various classes
of cases arising under federal law in which federal jurisdiction exists regardless of the
amount in controversy. See Armistead M. Dobie, Handbook of Federal Jurisdiction
and Procedure 132 (1928). These include suits arising under the laws pertaining to
internal revenue, postal regulation, patent, copyright and trademark laws, laws
regulating commerce, penalty and forfeiture law, bankruptcy, immigration, contract
labor laws, and antitrust regulation. See id. Also, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 41, the
jurisdictional amount has no application to criminal or admiralty law. See id. Further,
federal courts require no minimum amount to be in controversy for suits by the
United States, or for suits between citizens of the same state claiming lands under
grants of different states. See id.
24. See The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 3850 ($75,000);
The Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, 102 Stat. 4646 ($50,000); Act of
July 25, 1958, 72 Stat. 415 ($10,000); Act of March 3, 1911, 36 Stat. 1091 ($3,000); Act
of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552 ($2,000); The Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 § 11, 1 Stat.
79 ($500).
25. See 18 Cong. Rec. 2544-55 (1887).
26. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Herbert Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the
Federal System 39 (1953) ("To prevent defendants from being summoned long
distances to defend small claims, the jurisdiction was restricted to cases in which the
matter in dispute exceeded five hundred dollars.").
27. See supra note 24.
28. See 14B Wright et al., supra note 15, § 3701, at 3-4; Note, Federal Jurisdictional
Amount Determination of the Matter in Controversy, 73 Harv. L Rev. 1369, 1369
(1960); see also S. Rep. No. 1830-85 (1958) (explaining that the goal for setting a
jurisdictional amount was to choose a figure "not so high as to convert the [flederal
courts into courts of big business nor so low as to fritter away their time in the trial of
petty controversies").
29. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
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amount is not an available alternative. When the amount in
controversy appears to be inadequate, either party, or the court itself,
may raise the issue at any time during the life of the litigation.3 Once
the issue surfaces, the party seeking to assert jurisdiction and avoid
dismissalP must show that it does not "appear to a legal certainty that
the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount.' '32
In both the removal and original jurisdiction contexts, courts
compute the amount in controversy based on the circumstances as
they existed at the moment plaintiff filed suit.33 Courts will consider
only the direct effects of the possible judgment, not collateral effects
that the possible judgment may have by way of res judicata or stare
decisis.Y The amount in controversy does not decrease in light of
valid defenses that plaintiff anticipates in the complaint or that
defendant asserts in the answer.35 Even if plaintiff eventually fails to
recover an amount above the jurisdictional minimum, federal
jurisdiction does not detach.3
The "legal certainty" test grants courts some discretion in choosing
the standard for calculating the amount in controversy. 37 As has long
been the case," lower courts have used this discretion to resist the
ascendance of a single rule for determining the jurisdictional amount.
The Supreme Court has never expressly eliminated or endorsed any
method of determination, but has been grappling with the issue for
over a century.
The Supreme Court suggested an early approach to determining the
amount in controversy in Mississippi & Missouri R.R. Co. v. Ward.31
In Ward, complainant, a steamboat owner, did not demand money
damages, but instead sued in diversity to have a bridge abated as a
30. See id.
31. In the removal jurisdiction context this party is the defendant, in the original
jurisdiction context this party is the plaintiff.
32. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283,289 (1938).
33. See id. at 294.
34. See Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 267 (1934); New England Mortgage Sec. Co.
v. Gay, 145 U.S. 123, 130 (1892). If courts were to consider these collateral effects,
the value of suits would increase significantly, and the availability of the federal courts
would consequently extend well beyond its present scope.
35. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 303 U.S. at 292.
36. See id. at 289.
37. See Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 71-72 (1939). For example, courts sometimes
look beyond the initial pleadings to discovery and affidavits in order to determine the
exact amount in controversy between the parties. See Wheelon v. Allied Prods. Corp.,
929 F. Supp. 316,318 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
38. See William W. Hurst, Note, Jurisdictional Amount in the Federal District
Courts, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 146, 151 (1950) ("Certainly the courts have adequately
demonstrated that they are not going to submit wholeheartedly to the plaintiff-
viewpoint rule without an express command from the Supreme Court."). For further
discussion of the "plaintiff-viewpoint" rule, see infra Part I.B.1.
39. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 485 (1862).
1724 [Vol. 68
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nuisance.A Because complainant had not alleged a specific dollar
amount to be in controversy, but had instead asked for injunctive
relief, the Supreme Court faced the novel challenge of assessing the
value of the dispute to determine whether federal jurisdiction
existed.41
The Ward Court addressed the jurisdictional amount issue by
writing:
The character of the nuisance and the sufficiency of the damage
sustained is to be judged by the [clourts. But the want of a sufficient
amount of damage having been sustained to give the Federal Courtsjurisdiction, will not defeat the remedy, as the removal of the
[bridge] is the matter of controversy, and the value of the object
must govern.42
Apparently satisfied that the above explanation was exhaustive, the
Court shed no further light on its reasoning. Unfortunately, it is
impossible to conclude with any certainty exactly what the Court
meant by the "value of the object." Such cryptic language could refer
to the value of the bridge, the decrease in value of complainant's
shipping business, the cost of destroying the bridge, or the value of
complainant's right to navigate the Mississippi River free of
hindrance.43 More than fifty years later, in Glenwood Light & Water
Co. v. Mutual Light, Heat & Power Co.," the Supreme Court
employed the same "value of the object" language it used in the Ward
decision,' 5 but provided more evidence of its reasoning.
In Glenwood, complainant sought an injunction to prevent a rival
company from maintaining poles and wires that would "injure or
endanger the property of complainant and its customers and the
safety and lives of complainant's customers and [employees] ...
The district court held that the suit's value was the cost to defendant
of removing the offending poles and wires. Upon testimony that the
cost of such an effort did not exceed the statutory minimum,.' the
district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In
40. See id. at 486. Complainant alleged that the bridge had made navigation of
the Mississippi "dangerous and difficult," and that the bridge had substantially
increased the costs of his shipping business. Id. at 487. Complainant claimed that the
bridge had caused over $1,000 in damages to his boats, and that the damage had
forced him to pay increased insurance premiums. See id. Rather than suing at law,
however, complainant brought his suit in equity. See id. at 488.
41. In 1862, the federal jurisdictional minimum was $500. See The Federal
Judiciary Act of 1789 § 11, 1 Stat. 79.
42. Ward, 67 U.S. at 492 (citations omitted).
43. See 14B Wright et aL., supra note 15, § 3703, at 114.
44. 239 U.S. 121 (1915).
45. See Ward, 67 U.S. at 492 (citations omitted).
46. Glenwood, 239 U.S. at 124.
47. In 1915, the federal jurisdictional minimum was $3,000. See Act of March 3,
1911, 36 Stat. 1091.
2000] 1725
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reversing,4 the Supreme Court criticized the district court's
construction of the jurisdictional amount:
The District Court erred in testing the jurisdiction by the amount
that it would cost defendant to remove its poles and wires where
they conflict or interfere with those of complainant, and replacing
them in such a position as to avoid the interference. Complainant
sets up a right to maintain and operate its plant and conduct its
business free from wrongful interference by defendant. This right is
alleged to be of a value in excess of the jurisdictional amount, and at
the hearing no question seems to have been made but that it has
such value. The relief sought is the protection of that right, now and
in the future, and the value of that protection is determinative of the
jurisdiction.49
The Glenwood Court's reasoning supports an argument that the
"value of the object" of a suit could be the value of the action to the
plaintiff. The Glenwood opinion implies that, at the very least, the
value of the complainant's right to conduct business free from
interference is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Glenwood does not
exclude the possibility, however, that had complainant's interest not
been of sufficient value, defendant's stake could have counted to meet
the amount requirement.-0 As Glenwood illustrates, the Supreme
Court's "value of the object" approach was imprecise, and was
therefore not useful as a general standard for determining the
jurisdictional amount. Courts have since tried to craft standards that
apply more consistently to a wide range of scenarios. Generally, three
methods for determining the jurisdictional amount evolved from the
original "value of the object" approach: the "plaintiff-viewpoint"
approach, the "either-party" approach, and the "party-invoking-
jurisdiction" approach.
B. Competing Approaches To Determination
1. The "Plaintiff-Viewpoint" Approach
Armistead Dobie, before becoming a judge for the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, first suggested the "plaintiff-viewpoint" approach
to determining the amount in controversy in an article for the Harvard
Law Review.', Dobie perceived great confusion amongst federal
courts regarding the jurisdictional amount requirement.52 In an effort
to alleviate that confusion, Dobie proposed the following rule: "[t]he
48. See Glenwood, 239 U.S. at 126.
49. Id.
50. See 14B Wright et al., supra note 15, § 3703, at 119-20.
51. See Armistead M. Dobie, Jurisdictional Amount in the United States District
Court, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 733 (1925) [hereinafter Dobie, Jurisdictional Amount].
52. See id. at 752 ("At present, [the federal courts] are working under mere
congeries of rules; to call these rules a system would be an exaggerated euphemism.").
1726 [Vol. 68
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amount in controversy in the United States District Court is always to
be determined by the value to the plaintiff of the right which he in
good faith asserts in his pleading that sets forth the operative facts
which constitute his cause of action."-" In other words, under the
"plaintiff-viewpoint" approach, only plaintiff's claims count toward
the jurisdictional amount; defendant's counterclaims are irrelevant.
Dobie argued that his position, "if consistently and bravely followed,
will... serve materially to lighten the labors of the courts in their
efforts to determine what is (and what is not) the amount in
controversy in the vast number of cases that are daily brought before
them."'5 4 The simplicity of the "plaintiff-viewpoint" approach, a
simplicity similar to that of the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, has
resonated with many courts since Dobie's initial proposal.-3 Even the
Supreme Court, at times, has employed reasoning that closely
resembles the arguments supporting the "plaintiff-viewpoint"
approach.56 Perhaps the best illustration of this fact is the Court's
53. Id at 734.
54. Id at 752.
55. See, e.g., St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Greenberg, 134 F.3d 1250, 1253 (5th Cir.
1998) ("The district court must first examine the complaint to determine whether it is
'facially apparent' that the claims exceed the jurisdictional amount."); Motorists
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Simpson, 404 F.2d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 1968) ("When a claim over
which there is otherwise jurisdiction does not embrace an amount in controversy in
excess of that required by the statute, the 'plaintiff-viewpoint' rule, under which
jurisdiction is determined on the basis of what the plaintiff claims, requires dismissal
of the claim."); Continental Ozark, Inc., v. Fleet Supplies, Inc., 908 F. Supp. 668, 672
(W.D. Ark. 1995) ("We believe [that the 'plaintiff-viewpoint' rule] requires us to hold
that the amount at stake in a counterclaim, whether compulsory or not, may not be
used in determining the amount in controversy."); Oliver v. Haas, 777 F. Supp. 1040,
1041 (D.P.R. 1991); West Virginia State Bar v. Bostic, 351 F. Supp. 1118, 1121 (S.D.
W. Va. 1972); Hall v. Bowman, 171 F. Supp. 454, 456 (E.D. Mo. 1959) ("[T]he logical
and the majority rule is that the question of jurisdictional amount is based upon the
plaintiff's [p]etition or [c]omplaint....").
56. The Supreme Court's decisions in Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), and
Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973), are frequently cited as indicating
the Court's intent to restrict litigants' access to federal courts in diversity actions
tightly, a policy that would be well-served by the "plaintiff-viewpoint" approach.
Snyder and Zahn stand for the proposition that every member of a class action must
independently meet the jurisdictional amount requirement. See Chemerinsky, supra
note 9, § 5.3, at 293. These cases have been severely criticized as unduly restricting
the availability of class action lawsuits. See, eg., Brian Mattis & James S. Mitchell,
The Trouble with Zahn: Progeny of Snyder v. Harris Further Cripples Class Actions,
53 Neb. L. Rev. 137 (1974). While Zahn may indicate the Supreme Court's
inclination to restrict diversity jurisdiction severely, that is far from a settled
conclusion. This is especially true considering that the Seventh and Fifth Circuit
Courts of Appeals have held that 28 U.S.C. § 1367 overrules Zahn. See Stromberg
Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 930-32 (7th Cir. 1996); In re
Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 527-29 (5th Cir. 1995). These courts reason that because
section 1367(b), which carves out exceptions to section 1367(a)'s general grant of
supplemental jurisdiction over related claims, does not list class action lawsuits as an
exception, supplemental jurisdiction over them must exist. See Stromberg Metal
Works, 77 F.3d at 931-32; In re Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d at 527.
2000] 1727
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decision in St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co.51
In St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., the Supreme Court held that
"[t]he inability of plaintiff to recover an amount adequate to give the
court jurisdiction does not.., oust the jurisdiction." An Indiana
corporation, Red Cab, had entered into an insurance contract with a
Minnesota insurer.,, The complaint alleged that Red Cab's employees
had suffered injuries during the term of the insurance contract, for
which they made claims.w0 Red Cab brought suit in state court
claiming $4,000 in damages for the alleged breach,61 an amount
exceeding the applicable jurisdictional minimum.62 The insurer
removed to federal district court in southern Indiana.63 Defendant
waived a jury trial and the district court entered judgment for Red
Cab in the amount of $1162.98. 64 The insurer appealed, but the circuit
court refused to decide on the merits because, based on its reading of
the record, the amount in controversy was not adequate to give the
district court jurisdiction.6 The circuit court took the position that the
amount of the actual recovery, rather than the damages originally
claimed, was determinative of the amount in controversy. The circuit
court's reasoning implied that federal subject matter jurisdiction could
detach subsequent to the commencement of suit if plaintiff failed to
recover damages exceeding the jurisdictional minimum.
In reversing the circuit court's ruling,66 the Supreme Court
employed reasoning that resembled that of the "plaintiff-viewpoint"
approach:
The intent of Congress drastically to restrict federal jurisdiction in
controversies between citizens of different states has always been
rigorously enforced by the courts. The rule governing dismissal for
want of jurisdiction in cases brought in the federal court is that,
unless law gives a different rule, the sum claimed by the plaintiff
controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith.61
If read independently from context, the Court's language directly
endorses a "plaintiff-viewpoint" approach to determining the
jurisdictional amount. It is important to note, however, that the issue
57. 303 U.S. 283 (1938).
58. Id. at 289.
59. See id. at 284.
60. See id. Further, Red Cab alleged that the insurer had knowledge of the claims,
investigated them, yet after the expiration of the contract, denied liability. See id.
61. See id. at 285.
62. In 1937, the federal jurisdictional minimum was $3,000. See Act of March 3,
1911, 36 Stat. 1091.
63. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 303 U.S. at 285.
64. See id.
65. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 90 F.2d 229, 230 (7th Cir.
1937), rev'd, 303 U.S. 283 (1938).
66. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 303 U.S. at 296.
67. Id. at 288.
1728 [Vol. 68
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decided in St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. concerned the point in
time from which a court should calculate the jurisdictional amount.
The decision did not address what elements a court should include in
its initial calculation. Thus, St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. did not
foreclose the possibility that approaches to measuring the amount in
controversy other than the "plaintiff-viewpoint" would develop.
2. The "Either-Party" Approach
The "plaintiff-viewpoint" rule ignores defendant's stake in the
litigation for the purposes of calculating the jurisdictional amount. As
discussed in Part III,6s this is problematic when defendant's pecuniary
interest in the lawsuit is greater than plaintiff's, because the party with
the most to lose ends up having the least control over the litigation.
To address this imperfection, some courts have developed an
approach that measures the value of a dispute from the position of
either or both parties.69 These courts therefore include a defendant's
counterclaims when measuring the amount in controversy.?
Supporters of the "either-party" approach contend that a plaintiff's
complaint "initiates the legal action, but it is not the totality of the
controversy. It is merely the portion of the controversy for which
plaintiff seeks relief."'7 As Professor James Moore, an advocate of the
"either-party" approach, argues:
If the jurisdictional amount requirement serves any salutary function
68. See discussion infra Part III.A.
69. See Spectacor Management Group v. Brown, 131 F.3d 120, 122 (3d Cir. 1997)
("Where the circumstances surrounding a plaintiff's claim require a defendant to
assert a counterclaim under Rule 13(a), defendant's claim is part of the controversy
set forth in the plaintiff's complaint."); Ronzio v. Denver & RIG.W.R. Co., 116 F.2d
604, 606 (10th Cir. 1940) ("In determining the matter in controversy, we may look to
the object sought to be accomplished by the plaintiffs' complaint; the test for
determining the amount in controversy is the pecuniary result to either part) which
the judgment would directly produce." (emphasis added)); Roberts Mining & Milling
Co. v. Schrader, 95 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1938) ("[Defendant's] counterclaim was
sufficient to bring the case within the jurisdiction of the [d]istrict [cjourt, regardless of
the lack of jurisdictional averments in the bill of complaint."); Home Life Ins. Co. v.
Sipp, 11 F.2d 474, 476 (3d Cir. 1926); Swallow & Assocs. v. Henry Molded Prods.,
Inc., 794 F. Supp. 660, 663 (E.D. Mich. 1992) ("[C]onsideration of the amount in
controversy should include... the damages pled in a compulsory counterclaim.");
Lange v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 99 F. Supp. 1, 3 (S.D. Iowa 1951);
American Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Winzeler, 227 F. 321, 324 (N.D. Ohio 1915)
("[W]hen the jurisdictional amount is in question, the tendering of a counterclaim in
an amount which in itself, or added to the amount claimed in the petition, makes up a
sum equal to the amount necessary to the jurisdiction of this court, jurisdiction is
established, whatever may be the state of the plaintiff's complaint."); Lee v.
Continental Ins. Co., 74 F. 424, 425 (D. Utah 1896) ("[Tlhe amount involved in a
counterclaim is a part of the subject-matter in dispute ....").
70. Generally, these courts include only defendant's compulsory counterclaims,
and exclude any permissive counterclaims from the jurisdictional amount calculation.
See discussion infra Part II.
71. Spectacor, 131 F.3d at 122.
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it is to measure the substantiality of the claim. We believe that the
substantiality of the claim can best be gauged by reference to what is
actually at stake in the litigation rather than by strict reference to
plaintiff's claim for relief.7
As is the case with the "plaintiff-viewpoint" rule, the Supreme Court
has never specifically endorsed an "either-party" approach, but
reasoning supporting it has appeared in various Supreme Court
decisions.
In Kirby v. American Soda Fountain Co.,1 plaintiff filed suit in state
court alleging $1,500 in damages,74 an amount below the then $2,000
federal jurisdictional minimum.75 Later, plaintiff filed an amended
complaint that alleged damages in excess of the jurisdictional
amount.,6 Defendant removed to federal court and there filed a
counterclaim for $1,700.n Plaintiff filed for remand to state court,
arguing that the court should have considered only his original
complaint when determining jurisdiction.78 The district court denied
plaintiff's motion to remand, and plaintiff appealed. 79
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling that the suit
was indeed removable.80 To do so, the Court need only have relied on
the value of plaintiffs amended complaint.,, Instead, the Court
observed, "[i]n the first place, the whole record being considered, the
value of the matter in dispute might well have been held to exceed
two thousand dollars, exclusive of interests and costs .... Taking the
bill, defendant's answer and the cross bill together, the jurisdictional
amount was made out."' 2 The Kirby Court's consideration of
defendant's counterclaim suggests that it would have approved of an
"either-party" approach to calculating the amount in controversy.
The Kirby decision was not a Supreme Court anomaly; the Court has
employed similar reasoning in other decisions. One of the more
famous examples, famous by way of the controversy it incited, is
Horton v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.83
Plaintiff Horton, a Texas resident, was injured while working for an
employer insured by defendant Liberty Mutual, a Massachusetts
72. 1A James Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice 0.167[8], at 500-01 (2d ed.
1996).
73. 194 U.S. 141 (1904).
74. See id. at 142.
75. See Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552.
76. See Kirby, 194 U.S. at 142.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 142-43.
79. See id. at 143.
80. See id. at 146.
81. See Dobie, Jurisdictional Amount, supra note 51, at 747.
82. Kirby, 194 U.S. at 144-45 (citations omitted).
83. 367 U.S. 348 (1961).
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corporation.8 Horton filed a claim with the Texas Industrial Accident
Board against both his employer and Liberty Mutual alleging $14,0351
in damages.86 After hearings, the Board awarded Horton $1,050.0
Liberty Mutual immediately brought suit in federal district court.-
"alleging that [Horton] had claimed, was claiming and would claim
$14,035, but denying that [Horton] was entitled to recover anything at
all under Texas law."8, Liberty Mutual used the $14,035 it anticipated
Horton would claim in damages as its basis for subject matter
jurisdiction.9° Horton, also unsatisfied by the Board's decision, filed
suit in state court for the full $14,035. 9' Additionally, Horton moved
to dismiss the district court suit, arguing that the amount in
controversy9 was only the amount of the award, $1,050, not the
amount of his original claim, $14,035.-1 The district court dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the amount in
controversy was indeed only the amount of the award.w The circuit
court reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari "to decide
the important jurisdictional questions" raised by the case.9-
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's ruling, and held that
the amount in controversy was sufficient for the district court to
exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Liberty Mutual's diversity
suit.96 Although Liberty Mutual brought suit in federal court in order
to avoid paying the $1,050 award, the Court reasoned that the
applicable Texas law "leaves the entire $14,035 claim open for
adjudication in a de novo court trial, regardless of the award."n" The
Court went on to make the contentious declaration that "[n]o matter
84. See id at 349.
85. $14,035 was the statutory maximum recovery for worker's compensation
claims under Texas law. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. Texas worker's compensation law permitted either the employee or the
insurance company, if dissatisfied with the Board's award, to bring suit -in the county
where the injury occurred to set aside said final ruling." Id. In that event, the court
would decide the issue de novo, with the party claiming compensation bearing the
burden of proof. See idt
89. Id at 349-50.
90. See id- at 350.
91. See idt
92. In 1960, the federal jurisdictional minimum was $10,000. See Act of July 25,
1958, 72 Stat. 415.
93. See Horton, 367 U.S. at 350. To complicate matters, Horton
contemporaneously filed what he designated a compulsory counterclaim for S14,035
in the district court, subject to his motion to dismiss. See id. The Supreme Court did
not address this claim in its decision, but implied doubts as to whether the
counterclaim arose from the same transaction or occurrence as Liberty Mutual's suit
in federal court. See id. n.3.
94. See id at 350.
95. Id
96. See id at 355.
97. Id at 354.
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which party brings it into court, the controversy remains the same; it
involves the same amount of money and is to be adjudicated and
determined under the same rules."g
One interpretation of Horton is that if plaintiff asserts in the
complaint that defendant will bring a counterclaim in an amount
exceeding the statutory minimum, then the jurisdictional amount is
met. This reading is contrary to the principles of the "plaintiff-
viewpoint" approach. Some lower courts have viewed as
determinative the fact that Horton claimed damages above
jurisdictional amount in both state court and in federal court as a
conditional counterclaim." Thus, these courts would hold that, if
Horton had asked for too little in his federal counterclaim, jurisdiction
would not have existed even though his subsequent state court claim,
and Liberty Mutual's original claim before the Board, exceeded the
federal jurisdictional minimum.10° This reasoning, however, makes
Liberty Mutual's invocation of federal jurisdiction incongruously
dependent on what Horton decided to ask for after the initial
pleading.1°1
Some scholars, advocating a restrictive view of Horton, argue that
the decision does not address what method is appropriate for
calculating the jurisdictional amount.102  Instead, these scholars
contend that the Horton decision hinged on the fact that the suit in
question was before the district court for de novo review.Y3 Thus, the
issue before the federal court was identical to that before the Board:
whether to award Horton the full $14,035 that Texas law allowed.
Yet another interpretation of Horton treats the lawsuit as a
declaratory judgment action at equity.1°4  Under this logic, the
insurance company's subsequent suit in federal court was a request for
declaration of non-liability.1°5 In declaratory judgment actions, any
amount subject to declaratory relief determines the amount in
controversy.106
The Horton dissent recognized that the majority's reasoning
was open to multiple interpretations, and womed that the
decision would cause undue confusion in the lower courts:
The Court turns a new furrow in the field of diversity jurisdiction
today and, in so doing, plows under a rule of almost a quarter of a
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of North America v. Keeling, 360 F.2d 88, 90-91 (5th
Cir. 1966).
100. See id. at 91.
101. See 14B Wright et al., supra note 15, § 3706, at 222.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 222-23.
104. See Larry L. Teply & Ralph U. Whitten, Civil Procedure 453 (1991).
105. See id.
106. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (a) (1994).
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century's standing--the rule that in determining jurisdiction, "the
sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made
in good faith.107
The dissent went on to point out that "[t]his is the first time the Court
has let a plaintiff affix jurisdiction by prophesying what the defendant
would or might claim, rather than by stating what the plaintiff itself
did claim."'
Unless clarified by the Supreme Court, Horton will continue to be
"difficult to the point of impossibility" to digest.Y°9 The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals has accurately summarized Horton's reverberation
in the legal community: "[p]erhaps because Horton has so troubled
commentators and courts, it has been conspicuously absent from
discussions of the effect of counterclaims upon the amount in
controversy .... ."110 Regardless, the controversy surrounding Horton
has provided advocates of the "either-party" approach with the means
to argue reasonably that their position is consistent with Supreme
Court jurisprudence.
3. The "Party-Invoking-Jurisdiction" Approach
As is the case with the "either-party" approach, the "party-
invoking-jurisdiction" approach developed out of the dissatisfaction
felt by some in the legal community with the "plaintiff-viewpoint"
rule."' But not all of those opposed to the tight restrictions prescribed
by the "plaintiff-viewpoint" rule are comfortable with the highly
permissive policy suggested by the "either-party" approach. The
"either-party" approach directly contradicts the "plaintiff-viewpoint"
rule, as a court can look to any and all claims made by either party
when assessing jurisdiction. Under the "either-party" standard,
defendants can clinch their choice of a federal forum by bringing
counterclaims against plaintiffs, thus raising the stakes of the suit
above the federal jurisdictional minimum. Allowing such a practice
runs afoul of the traditional notionl2 that plaintiff is sole master of her
claim.
A somewhat more conservative approach adopted by a minority of
courts is to count only the stake of the party invoking the jurisdiction
107. Horton v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 355 (1960) (Clark, J.,
dissenting) (quoting St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283,288
(1938)).
108. Id at 356 (Clark, J., dissenting).
109. 14B Wright et al., supra note 15, § 3706, at 220.
110. Spectacor Management Group v. Brown, 131 F.3d 120, 126 n.9 (3d Cir. 1997).
111. See 1 James Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice 'I 0.91[1], at 817 (2d ed.
1996); Wright, supra note 9, § 34, at 192-93; 14B Wright et al., supra note 15, § 3703, at
121-25.
112. See supra note 15.
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of the federal forum. M  Thus, on removal, defendant's interest in the
litigation, exclusive of plaintiff's interest, would determine the
jurisdictional amount. Although the "party-invoking-jurisdiction"
approach broadens the jurisdiction of federal courts to a lesser extent
than the "either-party" approach, both share the same theoretical
differences from the "plaintiff-viewpoint" rule: depending on the
circumstances, a court can look beyond the initial pleading when
determining the amount in controversy.14  The "party-invoking-
jurisdiction" approach, however, has a serious flaw: it violates
statutory language"' providing that removal of an action is possible
only when the action could have been brought in federal court
originally.116 Perhaps for this reason, courts have rarely applied the
"party-invoking-jurisdiction" approach.
While the "plaintiff-viewpoint" approach has maintained a majority
following in the federal court system, it is an imperfect model. Fact
scenarios arise that Dobie's approach is not equipped to adequately
handle. Often, defendant's monetary stake in the lawsuit, as
represented by her counterclaims, is greater than plaintiff's stake.
The "plaintiff-viewpoint" rule fails to recognize that, in such
situations, it is not appropriate to allow plaintiff unilateral control
over forum selection.17 As Dobie himself observed, "[t]he plaintiff-
viewpoint theory seems subjected to its severest test in the case of the
counterclaim."118 The next part provides a brief description of
counterclaims' main features, and outlines scenarios in which courts
have considered including counterclaims in the jurisdictional amount
calculation.
II. PERMISSIVE AND COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIMS
This part first enumerates important features of both Rule 13(b)
permissive counterclaims and Rule 13(a) compulsory counterclaims.
It then describes the way in which, depending on what viewpoint the
court assumes to determine the amount in controversy, compulsory
counterclaims shift the balance of power between plaintiff and
defendant in asserting jurisdiction.
A. Permissive Counterclaims
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that "[a] pleading
113. See McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 595 F.2d 389, 392-93 (7th Cir. 1979);
Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 1969).
114. See 1 Moore et al., supra note 111, J 0.91[1], at 819.
115. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994).
116. The "party-invoking-jurisdiction" approach measures plaintiffs claims
originally, but switches standards on removal. The "either-party" approach avoids
violating section 1441 by applying the same standard both originally and on removal,
117. See discussion infra Part III.A.
118. Dobie, Jurisdictional Amount, supra note 51, at 744.
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may state as a counterclaim any claim against an opposing party not
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the opposing party's claim."119 The Rules refer to such
counterclaims as "permissive counterclaims."'2 A defendant does not
waiver' her right to raise permissive counterclaims in a later suit by
not doing so in her initial answer12  The philosophy supporting
permissive counterclaims is that it is convenient for parties to dispose
of all claims that exist between them, even if only tangentially related,
in a single suit.- Citing this policy argument as support, defendants
have tried to convince courts to include permissive counterclaims in
the jurisdictional amount in three scenarios.
In the first scenario, plaintiff's original complaint alleges damages
sufficient to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement.
Defendant then pleads a permissive counterclaim valued less than the
jurisdictional minimum. Defendant would argue that because the
core dispute meets jurisdictional requirements, the court should hear
related disputes in the interest of judicial economyY4 This argument
is inconsistent with a literal reading of the federal supplemental
jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367. That statute requires that
permissive counterclaims have an independent basis for jurisdiction in
order to be heard in federal courts.2 '  Courts have consistently
interpreted that requirement to mean that jurisdiction over permissive
counterclaims is unsustainable unless the amount involved exceeds
the statutory minimum.12
The second scenario occurs when plaintiff's complaint alleges an
amount below statutory requirements. The value of defendant's
permissive counterclaim, however, would raise the amount in
controversy above the jurisdictional minimum if added to the value of
the core claim.12 If courts allowed this, a state court defendant could
119. Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(b).
120. Id
121. For further discussion of waiver of the right to raise counterclaims in future
actions as the issue relates to the determination of the amount in controversy, see
infra note 137 and accompanying text.
122. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(b) ("A pleading may state as a counterclaim...."
(emphasis added)), with Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) ("A pleading shall state as a
counterclaim. ... " (emphasis added)). For a more complete discussion of Rule 13(a)
counterclaims, see infra Part II.B.
123. See Teply & Whitten, supra note 104, at 444.
124. See, e.g., Pro Medica, Inc. v. Theradyne Corp., 331 F. Supp. 231, 232 (D.P.R.
1971).
125. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1994) (providing that district courts shall have
supplemental jurisdiction only over claims that are "part of the same case or
controversy" as the original claim).
126. See Pro Medica, Inc., 331 F. Supp. at 232.
127. See, eg., Home Life Ins. Co. v. Sipp, 11 F.2d 474, 476 (3d Cir. 1926). This
situation arises only when defendant's permissive counterclaim is below the
jurisdictional minimum. Otherwise, defendant could independently file the claim in
federal court without resorting to any procedural slight of hand.
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remove to federal court on the basis of his permissive counterclaim.
Indeed, a plaintiff might even argue for including the permissive
counterclaim as part of the jurisdictional amount if her original claim
did not meet the statutory minimum.18 Dicta from cases decided
before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure indicate
that some courts accepted this type of aggregation.19 There is no
recent authority, however, that suggests that subject matter
jurisdiction exists in these circumstances. It would be unreasonable to
allow defendant to assert claims not directly related to the original suit
and thereby vest a federal court with jurisdiction when she could not
have brought the claims in federal court independently.'-
Yet a third scenario arises when defendant attempts to aggregate
several permissive counterclaims in order to meet the required
jurisdictional amount, thus rendering the counterclaims eligible for
federal adjudication.131 Courts have generally not allowed this tactic.
Some courts rejecting it in the removal context,' 32 however, have
allowed it when plaintiff's claim is independently sufficient to satisfy
federal jurisdictional requirements.13 Nonetheless, this scenario does
128. See id.
129. See Central Commercial Co. v. Jones-Dusenbury Co., 251 F. 13, 19 (7th Cir.
1918) ("For purposes of jurisdiction it has been frequently held that in cases similar to
the instant case the matter involved includes the demands of both plaintiff and
defendant."); American Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Winzeler, 227 F. 321, 324 (N.D.
Ohio 1915) ("It is established, of course, that, when the jurisdictional amount is in
question, the tendering of a counterclaim in an amount which in itself, or added to the
amount claimed in the petition, makes up a sum equal to the amount necessary to the
jurisdiction of this court, jurisdiction is established, whatever may be the state of the
plaintiff's complaint.").
130. See 14B Wright et al., supra note 15, § 3706, at 214.
131. See, e.g., Seneca Falls Mach. Co. v. McBeth, 246 F. Supp. 271, 273 (W.D. Pa.
1965). modified, 368 F.2d 915 (3d Cir. 1966).
132. A plaintiff might argue for allowing aggregation of defendant's permissive
counterclaims in this situation, hoping to remove eventually to federal court. An
early version of the removal statute permitted removal by either party. See Act of
March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470. The language of the present statute refers
only to defendants, and courts generally do not interpret that language as affording
plaintiffs the right to remove. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100,
108 (1941). But see Note, supra note 28, at 1380-81 (criticizing the Shamrock Oil &
Gas Corp. decision as inconsistent with the legislature's intent when it revised the
removal statute). Typically, courts justify their position regarding plaintiff removal on
the theory of waiver, or on a strict reading of 28 U.S.C. § 1441. See Joel M. Feinberg,
Establishing Federal Jurisdictional Amount by a Counterclaim, 21 Mo. L. Rev. 243,
244 (1956). There have been, however, rare instances when courts have permitted
plaintiff removal. See Chambers v. Skelly Oil Co., 87 F.2d 853, 854 (10th Cir. 1937)
(holding that under state procedural rules, a counterclaim "is a petition against the
plaintiff who becomes in effect a defendant thereto"); Carson & Rand Lumber Co. v.
Holtzclaw, 39 F. 578, 580 (E.D. Mo. 1889) (characterizing a non-resident plaintiff as a
"defendant" for the purposes of removal when the resident defendant brought a
counterclaim in excess of the federal jurisdictional amount).
133. See, e.g., Seneca Falls Mach. Co., 246 F. Supp. at 273. Defendant would argue
for allowing aggregation solely to satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1367. If this
argument failed, defendant could simply bring a new suit in federal court, in which
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not arise frequently, and thus has minimal impact on federal
jurisdiction.
As described above, the treatment of Rule 13(b) permissive
counterclaims with respect to the jurisdictional amount is fairly well-
settled. Courts generally do not interpret the supplemental
jurisdiction statute as allowing the use of permissive counterclaims,
either aggregated together or aggregated with plaintiff's complaint, to
sustain federal jurisdiction. Although adopting a contrary position
would be convenient for litigants, eased access to federal courts would
lead to gridlock in the federal docket. The cost would simply be too
high. A cost-benefit analysis yields less clear-cut results, however,
when contemplating the inclusion of Rule 13(a) compulsory
counterclaimso, in the jurisdictional amount.
B. Compulsory Counterclaims
Compulsory counterclaims did not exist at law prior to 1938,
although there was such a provision in the old Federal Equity RulesY5
Unlike permissive counterclaims, a defendant must plead compulsory
counterclaims in his initial answer,? or lose the right to do so in the
future. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a
defendant "shall" plead all counterclaims arising from the same
"transaction or occurrence" as the original claim,L's unless
adjudication of those counterclaims is impossible without the presence
of third parties. M Compulsory counterclaims need not independently
satisfy federal jurisdictional requirements, such as the jurisdictional
case the combined value of his various claims would confer federal jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See Merchants Heat & Light Co. v. J.B. Clow & Sons,
204 U.S. 286,288-90 (1907).
134. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
135. See Michael D. Conway, Note, Narrowing the Scope of Rule 13(a), 60 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 141,154 (1993).
136. The Federal Rules do, however, contain a relief provision: "When a pleader
fails to set up a counterclaim through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or
when justice requires, the pleader may by leave of court set up the counterclaim by
amendment." Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(0.
137. The Federal Rules do not specifically prescribe this result, but courts generally
agree that it is consistent with Congressional intent. See, eg., Baker v. Gold Seal
Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 469 n.1 (1974) ("A counterclaim which is compulsory but
is not brought is thereafter barred." (citation omitted)). Many advocates of including
compulsory counterclaims in the jurisdictional amount rely on this point as
justification. See Lange v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 99 F. Supp. 1, 2
(S.D. Iowa 1951) ("The 'matter in controversy' here is not the amount which plaintiff
claims, but is also that which under necessity the defendant must assert to be litigated
if it is to resist the plaintiff's demands and enforce its own .... [The defendant] is
deprived of any choice."). This reasoning elevates the importance of protecting non-
resident defendants from bias in state court above the importance of limiting the
federal docket.
138. Compulsory counterclaims may arise in any lawsuit, no matter how plaintiff
originally invoked the jurisdiction of the federal forum.
139. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
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amount,1'4 to be heard in federal court. 41
The circumstances in which a court might consider compulsory
counterclaims to be part of the amount in controversy are
uncomplicated: a plaintiff's claim fails to allege the jurisdictional
amount, but defendant's counterclaim, either on its own 42 or in
combination with plaintiffs claim'143 exceeds the statutory minimum.
Courts wishing to restrict access to the federal forum adhere to the
"plaintiff-viewpoint" approach, and exclude compulsory
counterclaims from the jurisdictional amount calculation. Courts
following the "either-party" approach consider defendant's
compulsory counterclaims, either by themselves or in conjunction with
plaintiffs complaint, when assessing jurisdiction, thus lowering the
barriers to the federal forum. Those courts advocating use of the
"party-invoking-jurisdiction" approach also increase the availability of
the federal forum by allowing a defendant wishing to remove to
provide the jurisdictional basis when plaintiff has not. The choice
between approaches has ramifications beyond establishing the scope
of federal jurisdiction, however. Whether a defendant can modify the
jurisdictional features of a lawsuit has a direct effect on plaintiff's
control over forum selection. The question becomes, then, whether
there are circumstances that warrant allowing defendant to gain access
to the federal forum even though plaintiff, through artful pleading,
has attempted to trap her in state court. The next part argues that
there are such circumstances, and proposes that a limited version of
the "either-party" approach best resolves those situations.
III. SUPERIORITY OF THE "EITHER-PARTY" APPROACH
This part criticizes the "plaintiff-viewpoint" approach,
demonstrating that it yields anomalous and undesirable results in
some situations. It then proposes that limited application of the
"either-party" approach would more effectively ensure that parties
are not unduly disadvantaged by their status as "defendants" rather
than "plaintiffs." Under the "either-party" approach, a plaintiff could
140. See Harry Shulman & Edward C. Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional Limitations
on Federal Procedure, 45 Yale L.J. 393, 415-17 (1936). While a contrary rule would
discourage defendants from removing to federal court, it would also encourage
plaintiffs to originally file in federal court to avoid counterclaims. See id. at 416. The
resultant increase in forum shopping would negate any benefits derived from
discouraging removal. See id.
141. Indeed, the supplemental jurisdiction of compulsory counterclaims would
apply even if defendant brought counterclaims pursuant to state law against non-
diverse parties. This conclusion flows from the observation that because compulsory
counterclaims need not have an independent basis for jurisdiction, their own
jurisdictional features are irrelevant.
142. See, e.g., Roberts Mining & Milling Co. v. Schrader, 95 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir.
1938).
143. See, e.g., Home Life Ins. Co. v. Sipp, 11 F.2d 474,476 (3d Cir. 1926).
1738 [Vol. 68
JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT
not deprive a deserving defendant of a federal forum merely by
winning the race to the courthouse.
A. The "Plaintiff-Viewpoint" Dilemma
The strongest rationale for challenging the majority consensus as to
the "plaintiff-viewpoint" approach is that it evolved from the "well-
pleaded complaint" rule, a rule devised solely for federal question
jurisdiction. By ignoring the origin and limitations of the "well-
pleaded complaint" rule, courts have dangerously allowed the law
concerning determination of the jurisdictional amount in diversity
actions to develop without any real scrutiny. Consequently, the
"plaintiff-viewpoint" rule's flaws have gone largely unnoticed, and
even when noticed, have often been summarily disregarded. This has
led to a gross inequality in the treatment of plaintiffs and defendants
in the federal courts with respect to forum selection.
The key failing of the "plaintiff-viewpoint" approach' " appears
most clearly in the context of removal jurisdiction. Strict adherence to
Dobie's rule creates a "race to the courthouse" when one party's stake
in the litigation is greater than the other party's. Imagine a lawsuit in
which both a resident party and a non-resident party have damages
above the statutory minimum. In an effort to prevent the non-
resident from taking advantage of the federal forum, the resident may
choose to file a claim in state court for less than the federal
jurisdictional amount.1s State law might compel the non-resident to
file a counterclaim, or lose her right to litigate the matter in the future.
She will not be able to remove, however, because only the resident's
claim will count toward the jurisdictional amount. Thus, by losing the
race to the courthouse, the non-resident will also lose the opportunity
to have her claim heard in federal court.
To protect her rights, the non-resident might file a parallel suit in
federal court. This option, however, viil not necessarily protect the
non-resident's interests. If the state court renders judgment first, that
verdict will be res judicata to the federal suit. 1,6 Knowing this, the
resident party can choose to file her claim in federal court as a
counterclaim,'4 7 hoping that the first forum to render judgment does so
in her favor, or attempting delay in the forum she has deemed less
144. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
145. See Iowa Lamb Corp. v. Kalene Indus., Inc., 871 F. Supp. 1149, 1155 (N.D.
Iowa 1994) (criticizing the fact that "[a] plaintiff may even avoid federal jurisdiction
or thwart attempts at removal by claiming less than the jurisdictional amount").
146. This consequence would be seen with respect to every issue in contention,
because issues decided in one forum would be binding on the other.
147. Rule 13(a) provides that counterclaims are not "compulsory" if -at the time
the action was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action." Fed.
R. Civ. P. 13(a). This provision ensures that although the non-resident's claim might
be heard in federal court, the resident's claim against him will be heard in state court
if she so wishes.
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sympathetic to her interests. In this scenario, there would be no
incentive for the resident to allow consolidation of all claims in one
forum because doing so would only help the non-resident. The
resultant multiple litigation, however, would defeat the interests of
judicial economy.
A possible way of protecting the non-resident's interest would be
for the federal court to enjoin the state court proceeding.", This
solution is foreclosed, however, because such aggressive action by a
federal court generally violates the Anti-Injunction Act. 49 The Act
provides that, "[a] court of the United States may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments."',' Unless the
federal forum was very close to reaching a settlement or judgment, it
would be unable to impede the state action.
As illustrated above, the "plaintiff-viewpoint" rule is too rigid to
ensure that a party's access to the federal forum is not diminished by
the "defendant" classification. The rule for determining the
jurisdictional amount should depend "upon the circumstances thereof;
and, inasmuch as fact settings are infinitely varying, it is evident that a
principle or principles which shall govern all cases cannot be
formulated."'5' In the removal context, the "plaintiff-viewpoint"
approach allows the party with the least at stake to dictate forum
preference merely by filing suit first. In order to prevent overly
formalistic reasoning from disadvantaging parties on the sole basis
that they did not win the race to the courthouse, a more flexible
approach is necessary for determining the amount in controversy.
B. The "Either-Party" Solution
Adopting a limited version of the "either-party" approach,"2 and
thereby allowing compulsory counterclaims to independently satisfy
the jurisdictional amount requirement, exclusive of plaintiff's
complaint, would cure the defects inherent in the "plaintiff-viewpoint"
rule. Under this approach, federal jurisdiction, both removal and
original, would exist provided that at least one party's interest in the
litigation independently exceeds the minimum jurisdictional amount.
Plaintiff would no longer be able to deprive a deserving defendant of
a federal forum by quickly filing a small claim in state court.
148. See Asset Allocation & Management Co. v. Western Employers Ins. Co., 892
F.2d 566, 572 (7th Cir. 1989) (staying other action and thus compelling claim to be
filed as counterclaim).
149. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994).
150. Id.
151. Charles C. Montgomery, Manual of Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure § 95,
at 67 (4th ed. 1942).
152. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
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Additionally, a limited "either-party" rule would boost efficiency in
the courts overall. Parties desiring to take advantage of the federal
forum would be saved the effort of having to re-file lawsuits in
opposite positions when defendant's stake is above the jurisdictional
amount, but plaintiff's claim proves to be insufficient.'M
Further, the limited "either-party" rule is consistent with litigant
rights that courts already recognize. Where plaintiff had wanted the
federal forum originally, but failed to claim sufficient damages, she
would welcome a rule alloving defendant's claim to fill the
jurisdictional void.5  By the same token, defendant, if she does not
want to be in federal court, retains the right to counterclaim for an
amount below the jurisdictional minimum and move to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction'I By allowing defendant to choose
her forum, a court can avoid "the ridiculous result that would sacrifice
the choice of forum of the litigant with the greater monetary interest
at stake."'- This logic applies equally in the removal context.,-"
A more permissive application of the "either-party" approach than
this Note proposes, one that would allow aggregation of plaintiff's and
defendant's claims to meet the jurisdictional minimum, would also
effectively address the "plaintiff-viewpoint" rule's shortcomings, but
would represent a sizable expansion in the scope of federal
jurisdiction. Courts hesitant to increase the size of the already
immense federal docket would be unlikely to accept such a rule. A
limited "either-party" approach represents a compromise: federal
153. See Merchants Heat & Light Co. v. J.B. Clow & Sons, 204 U.S. 286,289 (1907)
("[B]y setting up its counterclaim the defendant became a plaintiff in its turn, invoked
the jurisdiction of the court in the same action and by invoking submitted to it.").
154. See Note, supra note 28, at 1377.
155. Some courts predicate allowing compulsory counterclaims to be part of the
amount in controversy on whether defendant has objected to jurisdiction. See, eg.,
Fenton v. Freedman, 748 F.2d 1358, 1359-60 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that jurisdiction
existed over each claim because the parties did not object to jurisdiction prior to filing
their counterclaims). If defendant has objected to jurisdiction, it seems reasonable to
honor his wishes. See Spectacor Management Group v. Brown, 131 F.3d 120, 128 (3d
Cir. 1997). A minority of courts argues that bringing a compulsory counterclaim and
allowing it to become part of the jurisdictional amount functions like a waiver of the
right to object to subject matter jurisdiction. See Roberts Mining & Milling Co., 95
F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1938) ("Consequently, from and after the filing of the
counterclaim, the [d]istrict [c]ourt had jurisdiction of this case."). Such courts reason
that "the defendant, if he elects to sue upon his claim in the action against him,
assumes the position of an actor and must take the consequences." Merchants Heat &
Light Co., 204 U.S. at 290. This result seems illogical, however, because the right to
object to subject matter jurisdiction is perpetual. See supra note 30 and accompanying
text.
156. Swallow & Assocs. v. Henry Molded Prods., Inc., 794 F. Supp. 660, 663 (E.D.
Mich. 1992).
157. In such a case, however, fairness may require allowing the plaintiff the option
to remove. See supra note 132. A state court plaintiff's interests change significantly




jurisdiction would expand beyond its present reach only when a
defendant files a compulsory counterclaim for an amount exceeding
the jurisdictional minimum. Thus, the policy of keeping small claims
out of federal court is preserved, but not at the expense of defendant's
rights. In this way, the limited "either-party" approach does not so
much expand jurisdiction as merely recognize and enforce the
principles behind established jurisdictional rules.158
Another problem with allowing aggregation of both parties' claims
for the purpose of meeting jurisdictional requirements is that doing so
resembles "bootstrapping." A court could cure a subject matter
jurisdiction defect in plaintiffs claim by adding the value of
defendant's compulsory counterclaim, and then assert supplemental
jurisdiction over defendant's counterclaim that by itself did not exceed
the jurisdictional minimum. Such conduct arguably violates Rule 82
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that "[the
Federal Rules] shall not be construed to extend or limit the
jurisdiction of the United States district courts .... ,,'9 By applying
the "either-party" rule only when defendant's claim independently
exceeds the jurisdictional amount, courts can avoid this difficulty.
Critics of the "either-party" approach argue that the "plaintiff-
viewpoint" rule yields more consistency and predictability. 11 Some
courts contend that allowing compulsory counterclaims, but not
permissive counterclaims, to provide the basis for removal would
make federal jurisdiction subject to state procedural rules
distinguishing permissive counterclaims from compulsory
counterclaims, a consequence that would breed inconsistency.6, This
argument incorrectly assumes, however, that federal courts would use
state classifications. For the very purpose of preserving consistency
and predictability, federal courts would likely continue to use the
classifications that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide.62 In
so doing, courts can ensure that similar cases receive the same
158. See Lange v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 99 F. Supp. 1, 2 (S.D.
Iowa 1951) ("We believe that what we here decide does not enlarge-it but
recognizes-the [Clongressional purpose...
159. Fed R. Civ. P. 82.
160. See Dobie, Jurisdictional Amount, supra note 51, at 752.
161. See Iowa Lamb Corp. v. Kalene Indus., 871 F. Supp. 1149, 1157 (N.D. Iowa
1994) ("To hold that a compulsory counterclaim, but not a permissive one, could
establish removal jurisdiction might surrender federal removal jurisdiction to the
inconsistencies of state laws concerning compulsory and permissive counterclaims.");
Cabe v. Pennwalt Corp., 372 F. Supp. 780, 782 (W.D.N.C. 1974) ("[Allowing
compulsory counterclaims to provide the basis for removal] would seem to make
federal removal procedure dependent upon state court practice and would thereby
create numerous tests for federal removability ... ").
162. See Feinberg, supra note 132, at 248 ("[N]o reason appears why district courts
could not use the definition of compulsory counterclaim contained in Rule 13(a),




treatment in each district court across the country.
Critics observe that because counterclaims cannot diminish the
recovery sought by plaintiff,'61 thereby divesting a court of jurisdiction,
allowing counterclaims to count in the jurisdictional amount, and
thereby vest a court with jurisdiction, would be non-uniform. This
logic ignores the fact that compulsory counterclaims are not defenses
to a plaintiff's cause of action. They are affirmative claims arising out
of the same events as plaintiff's claim. The rule preventing
counterclaims from divesting jurisdiction protects plaintiff from being
unfairly deprived of her choice of forum. Allowing counterclaims to
fulfill the jurisdictional amount requirement would not unfairly
deprive plaintiff of her rights. As evidenced by the removal statute,
when a controversy is large enough for federal adjudication, an in-
state plaintiff's forum preference is not a priority.',
One possible problem with allowing counterclaims to count toward
the jurisdictional amount centers on court sanctions. While plaintiffs
bear the risk of paying costs for filing a claim that leads to a recovery
below the jurisdictional amount,16 defendants have no such liability167
Thus, under the rule herein proposed, a removing defendant could
bring a frivolous counterclaim for the sole purpose of gaining access to
federal court, and not have to worry about suffering repercussions.
Congress could easily solve this problem, however, by amending
section 1332 to provide for defendant sanctions. Such an amendment
would have no undesirable collateral effects on the functioning of
federal courts.
A limited version of the "either-party" approach serves the interests
of procedural fairness and judicial economy far better than the
"plaintiff-viewpoint" rule. The impact of employing such a standard
on predictability and consistency would be negligible, and doing so
would not contradict any established authority. Allowing the
pecuniary interest of either party to satisfy jurisdictional requirements
allocates control of the litigation to the party with the most at stake,
rather than to the party who has won the race to the courthouse.
Consequently, the jurisdictional determination would depend on
justifiable factors, rather than capricious party classifications.
163. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
164. See Keyser v. Lyons Fin. Serv., 88 F. Supp. 816, 818 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1950); see
also Dobie, Jurisdictional Amount, supra note 51, at 745 ("If a defense is not to be
considered as reducing the amount in controversy, should it be used to increase that
amount?").
165. See discussion supra Introduction.
166. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c).




This Note's advocacy of a limited version of the "either-party"
approach to determining the jurisdictional amount relies on common
sense. The desire to increase efficiency in the federal courts by
limiting the scope of federal jurisdiction is laudable. That desire
should not, however, take priority over procedural consistency, a
feature of the justice system that is at the heart of due process. To
prevent open access to federal courts on the basis of the arbitrary
distinction between plaintiff and defendant unduly elevates form over
substance. The limited "either-party" approach would expand federal
jurisdiction beyond its traditional scope, but would still be well within
constitutional limits. In all cases where one party's stake exceeds the
statutory minimum, jurisdiction would exist. Dogged advocacy of the
"plaintiff-viewpoint" approach is irrational in that it ignores the
alternative more capable of achieving consistent results. Too often,
the "plaintiff-viewpoint" rule creates a double standard, improperly
allowing plaintiffs greater latitude in controlling forum selection than
defendants. Further, the "plaintiff-viewpoint" approach is based on
applying to diversity jurisdiction a rule that was designed to limit only
federal question jurisdiction. If the "well-pleaded complaint" rule is
to be applied to diversity jurisdiction, either the Supreme Court or
Congress should expressly say so. The integrity of the legal system
suffers when the rule of law materializes without authoritative
examination.
1744 [Vol. 68
